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ABSTRACT. Social-ecological resilience is an increasingly central paradigm for understanding sustainable resource
management. In this study, we aimed to better understand the effect of environmental variability on the resilience of fishery
systems, and the important role that social institutions and biophysical constraints play. To explore these issues, we built a
dynamic model of the pen shell fishery of the indigenous Seri people in the Gulf of California, Mexico. This model included
the dynamics of the two dominant species in the fishery (Atrina tuberculosa and Pinna rugosa), several institutional rules that
the Seri use, and a number of ecological constraints, including key stochastic variables derived from empirical data. We found
that modeling with multiple species, rather than the standard one-species model, uncovered more of the resilience that is present
in the system. We also found that it is the combination of several social-ecological rules working in conjunction with the
endogenous environmental variability that helps ensure the resilience of the system.
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INTRODUCTION
Sustaining small-scale fisheries is of vital importance to the
livelihood of many fishing communities across the world
(Berkes et al. 2001, Béné 2006). How to achieve this, however,
is unresolved because most of what we know about fisheries
comes from industrialized country’s experiences, which often
do not apply to small-scale fishing settings in developing
countries (Pauly 2006). One of the more striking differences
is the multi-species character of artisanal fisheries; artisanal
fishers are apt at switching harvested species depending on a
suite of social-ecological conditions, an adaptive strategy that
is linked to the apparent resilience of artisanal fisheries (Cinner
et al. 2012). Also, the compliance to regulations suited to the
specific socioeconomic and ecological contexts of each
fishery is important (McClanahan et al. 2011). 
Resilience is the amount of disturbance or change a system
can sustain without shifting from one system state to another
(Walker et al. 2004). The concept is non-normative; therefore,
the shift may be to a more or less desirable state, however
defined. When studying the resilience of social-ecological
systems (SESs), it is often not only the resilience of the natural
resource stocks that is in question but also that of the
institutions that govern these resources (Cashore and Howlett
2007, Young 2010). Other resilience studies of marine coastal
resources have explored sustainable small-scale fisheries as
related to path dependence and transformation in governance
(Gelcich et al. 2010), co-management and attributes of success
(Gutiérrez et al. 2011), and mismatches between industrial
fishery management and the biological and socioeconomic
context of invertebrate artisanal fisheries (Freire and García-
Allut 2000, Defeo and Castilla 2005).  
Previous works have observed that a system may be forced
over a threshold into an alternate state that may be reached
simply by the slow degradation of the system (Scheffer et al.
2001, Güneralp and Barlas 2003). Detecting the gradual
erosion of resilience is critical to assessing the vulnerability
of a community or ecosystem to variability in the environment
(Scheffer et al. 2001), but detection can be challenging and
requires systematic investigation of the interactions among its
various components. Moreover, while shocks and stressors are
critical to pushing a system close to a threshold, it may often
be natural stochastic variations that push it over the edge.
Environmental variability is ubiquitous in the natural world
and can play a critical role in the dynamics of SESs (Ludwig
et al. 1993). Stochasticity becomes central, then, to our
understanding of when and why shifts in system states occur
(Beisner et al. 2003).  
The area around the Infiernillo Channel, between the Sonora
mainland and Tiburon Island on the Gulf of California,
Mexico, is a protected homeland area for the Seri people, or
Comcáac people (Fig. 1). In their artisanal fishery, the Seri
harvest pen shells, or Callos de Hacha, large sessile bivalve
mollusks that live buried in the sand on the seafloor (Moreno
et al. 2005). Over the years, the Infiernillo Channel has
remained home to the most abundant pen shell beds in the
region, while the neighboring Mexican fishery of Kino Viejo
just south of the channel has been dramatically depleted
(Basurto et al. 2012). Extensive fieldwork and case studies
have indicated that the local institutions that the Seri have
created to govern their common pool resources play a key role
in their success (Basurto 2005, 2006).
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Fig. 1. Map of the study area—Seri fishing grounds.
Bueno and Basurto (2009) developed a deterministic dynamic
model to study the resilience of the pen shell fishery of the
Seri. Their study demonstrated the role of very small,
incremental endogenous changes in the relationship between
ecological and socio-cultural variables in facilitating the
collapse of a seemingly resilient system. We explore several
major elements of the system that have not been previously
examined, including its two-species character, using an
expanded model. The model incorporates both stochastic
elements and several social-ecological rules; we study how
their dynamic interactions affect the resilience of the system.
The social-ecological rules are the institutional rules and
ecological constraints that collectively govern harvesting
patterns in the fishery. Our objective is to systematically
analyze the potential role of (1) interactions between
institutional rules and biophysical settings, and (2) dynamic
environmental variability on the resilience of an SES, using
an experimental design framework. 
Our study has two main hypotheses. First is that including both
species in the model will more accurately capture the inherent
resilience of the system—as Seri fishers shift their harvest
between the two species according to their social-ecological
rules. Second is that incorporating environmental variability
into the model will increase the range of possible outcomes
and degrade the system’s resilience, on average, as the
increased variability will increase the system’s chances of
crossing over a threshold into collapse. We conducted a series
of simulation experiments to test these hypotheses, each with
different combinations of stochastic variables, institutional
rules, and biophysical constraints. Our results, which affirm
our first hypothesis but refute the second, can inform studies
on management of two-species artisanal fisheries.
METHODS
Building a dynamic model of the Seri social-ecological
system
The Seri fishery includes two major species—Atrina
tuberculosa (At) and Pinna rugosa (Pr) (Basurto 2006). At is
smaller and sells for a much higher price because it is only
sold fresh, while Pr is often sold frozen. Incorporating the
immature and mature population dynamics of both species and
Seri institutional rules provided a richer and more complete
representation of the system structure in relation to its
resilience properties than would a more conventional single-
species model (Shelton and Mangel 2011). A causal loop
diagram presents the major feedback structures of the modeled
system (Fig. 2). The time horizon of the simulations was 100
years; the time step was one week (0.02 years), small enough
to capture the finer grain of decision-making by the fishers as
well as the population dynamics of the species (Ford 1999).
The model was built using the Vensim software, produced by
Ventana Systems, Inc. The parameter values and assumptions
in the model were based on data and information collected
from the field over the past decade by X. Basurto, and from
peer-reviewed literature (Appendix 1). The full list of
equations and a copy of the model are provided in Appendices
2 and 3, respectively.  
Population growth, driven by two positive, or reinforcing,
feedback loops (R1a and R1b), is moderated by two negative,
or balancing, feedback loops (B2a and B2b), where an increase
in population causes a shrinking of the resources available to
the species, which results in fewer young pen shells surviving,
and thus a slowing of the population growth (Fig. 2). The
carrying capacity of each species was estimated by
extrapolating the total number of pen shells found in one
sample area to the total area and applying the average 2:1 ratio
of Pr to At (based on field data collected by X. Basurto for
three time periods: 2000–2001, 2004–2006, and 2009–2012).
This nonetheless remained a first-order approximation
because there were not sufficient data on habitat and
physiological characteristics of the two species to produce
more reliable estimates (Pineda 2000). The survival function
for newly recruited individuals was a smooth curve based on
the Beverton-Holt equation used to model fish populations,
wherein recruitment was based primarily on the population of
mature, reproducing individuals (Ricker 1975) (Fig. 3A).
Seri social-ecological rules
The Seri rely on several institutional rules in managing their
fishery; in addition, the fishery is subject to certain ecological
constraints imposed by its biophysical setting. We labeled
these rules and constraints, which collectively govern
harvesting patterns in the fishery, as social-ecological rules.
We present the social-ecological rules as they are explicitly
represented in the model. Social-ecological rules are not a
representation of how the Seri think of institutional constraints
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Fig. 2. Causal loop diagram showing the feedback loops and key variables in the model. Each arrow has a positive sign (+) or
negative sign (–), which signifies whether an increase in the variable at the root of the arrow creates an increase or decrease
in the variable at the terminus of the arrow. The variables that were altered in our experiments are italicized, with the
stochastic variables also underlined. Variables in the lower half of the figure with < > around them correspond to the
identically named variables in the top half; they are repeated to enhance readability. Pr refers to Pinna rugosa, At refers to
Atrina tuberculosa, and CDH refers to Callos de Hacha, or the entire pen shell population, including both species. R:
positive, or reinforcing, feedback loop; B: negative, or balancing, feedback loop.
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Fig. 3. (A) The survival function for newly recruited
individuals is a smooth curve based on the Beverton-Holt
equation used to model fish populations, wherein
recruitment is based primarily on the population of mature,
reproducing individuals. This curve shows survival of newly
recruited individuals compared to the total pen shell
population in the model. (B) Type III functional response
curve that drives the foraging behavior of the fishers in
switching their relative effort between the two pen shell
species. CDH refers to Callos de Hacha, or the entire pen
shell population, including both species Atrina tuberculosa 
and Pinna rugosa.
they design and articulate to outsiders. Rather, these rules
represent the authors’ translation and interpretation of how
key institutional and ecological constraints may affect the
dynamics of the social-ecological system in question: 
1. a rule governing the number of days spent harvesting pen
shells each year; 
2. a set of rules governing areas that are off-limits; 
3. a rule governing the allocation of harvest effort between
the two species; 
4. a set of rules governing the harvest of immature
individuals; 
5. a set of rules governing outsider fishing boats in the
territory and how those outsiders operate while in the
fishery. 
Rule 1 was set to 50%, or half the days of the year (it could
be increased or decreased to compensate for environmental
shocks, as was examined in Bueno and Basurto 2009). Rule 2
represents the rules that render certain areas off-limits for
commercial harvesting, and includes both ecological
constraints, such as seagrass beds, which are difficult and
hazardous areas in which to gather pen shells, and social rules
that reserve sandbars for subsistence fishing, mainly by
women, elders, children, and adults without access to diving
gear. When eelgrass (Zostera marina) is present in the channel,
the pen shell beds are covered and therefore out of reach for
harvesting (Basurto 2008). The limits on harvesting within
seagrass beds were implemented in the model through a
mechanism that reduces the harvest by a percentage equal to
that of the area covered by eelgrass during the eight months
of each year. The limits on harvesting from sandbars were
implemented by considering the sandbars to be permanently
outside the spatial coverage of the model (Bueno and Basurto
2009).  
Rule 3 involves the balancing feedback loops B3a, B3b, B4a,
and B4b in Fig. 2. Seri fishers report that they can, and do,
distinguish between the two species on the seafloor and
allocate their harvesting effort between the two according to
their relative abundance. While we hypothesized that this
method helps keep both populations from collapsing, we do
not assert that the Seri do this out of altruism or long-term
decision-making. There is a higher financial gain per unit
effort for harvesting At. At can only be sold fresh, and thus
commands a much higher price than Pr, which is often sold
frozen. Seri fishers would thus preferentially target At for
harvesting if it is sufficiently abundant. When At is much less
abundant, fishers either target the two species equally or even
preferentially harvest Pr because it is more beneficial to
harvest Pr rather than seek scarce At. We represented this
strategy as a functional form similar to Holling’s Type III
functional response curve. Our formulation of this rule was
similar to other optimal foraging theory (OFT) models that
assume a forager aims to maximize short-term gains, whether
in energy (for animals and subsistence hunters/fishers) or
revenue (for commercial artisanal fishers) (Stephens and
Krebs 1986, Aswani 1998). Because fishers switch between
only two species, the same OFT curve drives harvesting effort
for both species (Fig. 3B). As relevant data become available,
additional factors could be incorporated into this formulation,
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such as monetary units, or net effort expended in terms of
kilocalories (Aswani 1998, Béné and Tewfik 2001). 
Unlike some artisanal fisheries, the Seri do not have explicit
rules that forbid the harvesting of immature individuals;
nonetheless, empirical data indicate that immature individuals
generally make up less than 30% of the catch. Rule 4 represents
the combination of factors that keep immature harvests at this
level or below, including both the Seri preference for
harvesting, and ease of locating, larger individuals of either
species. Due to its slower growth rate, we hypothesized that
Pr would be less resilient in our model, absent of
countervailing forces. So, as a scenario analysis, we also
studied the effect on the system of modifying Rule 4 to
specifically ban harvesting of any immature Pr. 
The Seri regulate how many outsider boats are allowed in their
territory (Rule 5). A Seri fisherman must ride on each outsider
boat to ensure it follows the community’s rules. The Seri
fisherman actively participates in the harvest and reaps a share
of the catch, which is customarily determined to be equally
distributed among all crew members and the boat owner. The
increase in number of boats is one of the main stressors on the
fishery, and it is to this increase in harvest pressure that we
tested the resilience of our modeled system. Experiments
wherein institutional rules 3 and 4 were “turned off”
represented cases in which all the new boats were outsiders’
boats.
Incorporating stochasticity into the dynamic model
Three key parameters in the model were given stochastic
analogues to represent either environmental variability—in
the case of variables “lifespan of At” and “lifespan of Pr”—
or variability that relates to drivers of environmental forcing
and the social subsystem, in the case of variable “fishing luck.”
Thus, in our study, environmental variability refers to dynamic
demographic variation in recruitment, death, and harvest rates
in response to weather, disease, competition, predation, or
other factors not captured by the model. The stochasticity dealt
with in this model was in some ways different from the
stochasticity often studied in resilience science. Usually,
stochasticity is used to refer to shocks coming from outside
the system, which represents exogenous and hard-to-predict
risks. The mature lifetime variables, on the other hand, are
endogenous to the system. In the real world, environmental
variability is highly correlated over time (e.g., while a very
hot day can be followed by a very cold day, it is more likely
to be followed by another hot day). Thus, we modeled all three
stochastic variables so that the successive values of a variable
over time were, while following a random pattern, partly
conditioned on the values of that variable in the preceding time
points. It is as if the random variability in these variables had
inertia, or memory, in which the next value was not
independent of the last, as in a traditional random normal
Gaussian distribution, but depended on history (Sterman 2000:
917). This type of random process is called pink noise or 1/f
noise (Halley 1996). 
The literature suggests that At and Pr, which differ greatly in
size, may also differ in lifespan (Baqueiro and Castagna 1988).
At and related species grow rapidly and reach sexual
maturation at 1 year of age (Bueno and Basurto 2009). The
genus Atrina reaches sexual maturity at ~10 cm in shell length
(Ahumada-Sempoal et al. 2002), which suggests that the At 
harvested in the channel had a chance to reproduce at least
once before harvesting, as most of them (70.2%, n = 3261)
measured at least twice the minimum size for sexual maturity
(average size = 20.8 cm, SD = 2.53) (based on field data
collected by this study for three time periods: 2000–2001,
2004–2006, and 2009–2012). Literature on the lifespan of
species similar to P. rugosa, e.g., Spondylus calcifer and Pinna
nobilis, suggests that they can reach an age ranging from 12
to 20 years and take 2.5 to 4 years to mature (Vicente et al.
1980, Siletic and Peharda 2003, Cudney-Bueno and Rowell
2008). Thus, in the model, mature lifespans of At and Pr were
normally distributed with a mean of, respectively, 9 years (SD
= 2) and 12 years (SD = 3) and time to mature of 1 year and
2 years, respectively, to capture the differences between the
species. Because a new cohort of individuals is born each year,
the correlation time for both species was set as 1 year. 
Fishing luck captures influences on harvest success such as
weather conditions, malfunctioning equipment, skill and
experience of the crew, or turbidity of the water affecting the
divers’ harvesting efficiency. Fishing teams tend to choose
minimum-risk strategies depending on environmental
conditions such as seasonal weather, but that does not
guarantee every fishing outing will be a success. We assumed
that fishing luck was normally distributed (mean = 1, SD =
0.4) based on the recorded daily variation in harvests collected
by X. Basurto and colleagues in 2000, 2001, and 2009. While
many factors influence fishing luck, seasonal weather patterns
are crucial and more likely to be correlated over time than are
some of the other drivers of fishing luck; therefore, the
correlation interval of the random variability in fishing luck
was 0.25 years.
Validation testing
Prior to conducting our experiments, we built confidence in
the model by using several validation tests to ensure an
adequate representation of the SES for the purposes of our
study. The validation process was a gradual one, dispersed
throughout the methodology, beginning with model
conceptualization and continuing through experimentation
(Barlas 1996). Our model was not expected to provide “point”
predictions but rather to capture the broad dynamic patterns
of the system (behavioral validation) for the correct reasons
(structural validation). Therefore, the structural validity of the
model was as important as its behavioral validity. We divided
the formal validation work into two phases, following an
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established procedure in systems modeling (Barlas 1996). In
structural validation tests, we assessed the logical validity of
model equations by evaluating them individually and by
testing their behavior under extreme conditions. With behavior
validation tests, we evaluated the patterns of key variables
generated by the model against the available data. The
comparison between model-generated values and observed
values allowed us to evaluate if the model was an adequate
representation of the real-world system. The results of some
of these comparisons are discussed in the Results section.  
Across many disciplines, it has become recognized that expert
knowledge is an important and critical component of dynamic-
modeling studies (Balci 1994, Lutz and Samir 2010).
Therefore, in addition to these empirical tests, one of the co-
authors (X. Basurto) contributed his expert knowledge on the
Seri fishery extensively during the model building and
validation processes.
Hypotheses testing
To test our hypotheses, we compared model runs with
deterministic and stochastic lifetime and “fishing luck”
variables, and with and without social-ecological rules
governing relative foraging effort (Rule 3) and the harvest of
immature individuals (Rule 4), for a total of 16 scenarios. The
base case was fully deterministic and assumed there were no
social-ecological rules in force that distinguished between the
two species. In half the scenarios, lifetime was made
deterministic by setting At lifetime’s mean value of 9 years as
constant, and Pr lifetime’s mean value of 12 as constant, and
in the other half of the scenarios, lifetime was a stochastic
function, as previously described. Fishing luck could be either
a stochastic function or an identity function of 1. Rule 3 was
active when the fishers varied harvest effort between At and
Pr according to the OFT function from Figure 3B, or was “off”
when the relative abundance of the species was not considered.
The eight experiments where Rule 4 was active constituted a
scenario test where fishers did not harvest immature Pr. Each
experiment consisted of 10 replications to better capture the
breadth of random variability. For each of the 16 experiment
scenarios, we conducted two tests—one to test resilience to
collapse, and one to test the system’s ability to recover from
a near-collapsed state (referred to as the “collapse
experiments” and the “recovery experiments,” respectively). 
To test the system’s resilience to collapse, we let the system
operate with 15 boats, then increased the number of boats at
Year 5 and kept it constant for the remaining 95 years (the
starting point of 15 boats was consistent with the field data
collected by this study during 2000–2001, 2004–2006, and
2009–2012). We ran a multivariate sensitivity analysis for
each experiment with 10 replications, and varied the number
of additional boats between 0 and 50 to represent the change
in fishing pressure. Collapse was defined as the overall pen
shell population falling below 10% of carrying capacity in
more than 2/3 of the runs for that level of fishing pressure. In
order to capture the range of variability, we also recorded the
“range” for each collapse experiment—the difference between
the number of boats required to cause the overall pen shell
population to fall below 10% of carrying capacity in at least
one replication and the number of boats required to cause the
overall pen shell population to fall below 10% of carrying
capacity in each of the 10 runs. 
To look at the system’s ability to bounce back, we ran a second
set of experiments. In each experiment, we increased the
number of boats in Year 5 from 15 to a number sufficient to
engender eventual collapse, and then 30 years later, we brought
the fishing effort back down to 15 boats—representing a
scenario in which, for instance, the Seri decide to no longer
allow outside fishers into their channel. Because of the wide
variation in the critical level of fishing effort across the
experiments, one single elevated fishing effort level could not
be chosen to engender collapse in all the experiments. To
compare like items, we separated the 16 experiments into four
groups depending on which social-ecological rules were active
or not, and identified the average threshold level, and then ran
all four recovery experiments for that set with the same number
of boats. Recovery was defined as the first stretch of more than
5 years where the total pen shell population equaled or
exceeded the level it was at prior to the increase in fishing
pressure in Year 5. As with the collapse experiments, each
experiment consisted of 10 replications.
RESULTS
Prior to running any experiments, we compared model results
with real-world data for validation purposes. The most detailed
observed data were from daily harvests of the two species (by
weight). Data collected by X. Basurto in 2000, 2001, and 2009
suggested that the daily harvest of an individual Seri boat crew
is, on average, 27 kg of Pr and 7 kg of At, that there are, on
average, 15 Seri boat crews harvesting on any given day, and
that crews harvest, on average, 50% of the days in each year.
Extrapolating daily harvests into a yearly harvest, with the
average fleet of 15 boats fishing 50% of the year, yielded an
average (median) yearly harvest of 82 tons of Pr and 14 tons
of At. Our model predicted that a fleet of 15 boats operating
in conditions similar to experiment #8 would harvest, on
average (median), about 82 tons of Pr and 13 tons of At each
year. Experiment #8, with both stochastic rules and the OFT
effort switching rule but with no limitation on harvesting of
immature pen shells, most closely resembled the real-world
conditions of the Seri fishery during the time period for the
observed data. The 75th and 25th percentiles and maximum
and minimum (nonoutlier) values of the extrapolated observed
harvest yield were also very similar to the model results. The
observed and modeled probability distributions are shown in
Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Validation of the pen shell harvest in tons per year.
Pr refers to Pinna rugosa, At refers to Atrina tuberculosa,
and CDH refers to Callos de Hacha, or the entire pen shell
population. The two box plots on the left show the
maximum, 75th percentile, median, 25th percentile, and
minimum harvest values (excluding outliers) as extrapolated
from the observed harvest data. The box plots at right show
the distribution for harvest tonnage as calculated by the
model over a 100-year period under conditions similar to
experiment #8 (the experiment with the most realistic base
conditions).
In the first set of experiments on the collapse threshold, there
appeared to be four distinct cohorts of experiments, depending
on which social-ecological rules were in place (Table 1). In
the base-case scenario (experiment #1), it took 23 boats to
overharvest the system to the point of collapse; this did not
change with the addition of either one of the stochastic rules
(experiments #2 and #3), and with both stochastic rules active,
a collapse threshold of 24 boats resulted (experiment #4). As
expected, the system was most resilient with all social-
ecological rules in place. With both rules in place (experiments
#13–#16), it took 50–52 boats to collapse the fishery; with
only Rule 3 in place (experiments #5–#8), it took 40–42 boats;
and with only Rule 4 in place (experiments #9–#12), it took
26–27 boats. Several sample runs illustrating collapse
scenarios in different experiments are shown in Fig. 5A. 
The recovery experiments likewise sorted into the four cohorts
based on the institutional rules (Table 2). With both
institutional rules active, the system recovered in 5.6–13 years
(average recovery of 10.3–12.4 years). When the fishers took
into account the relative abundance of the species (Rule 3),
but did not limit the harvest of immature Pr, the system
recovered in 18.2–29.0 years (average recovery of 19.2–22.6
Fig. 5. (A) Four examples of model runs showing the collapse
trajectory of the total Callos de Hacha (CDH), or pen shell,
population in different experiments. (B) Five example runs
showing the collapse-and-recovery of the total CDH
population in different experiments. Note that experiments #1
and #4 do not ever fully recover: this is because the Pinna
rugosa (Pr) population has collapsed, as shown in Fig. 5C.
(C) Four example runs showing the collapse-and-recovery of
the Pr population in different experiments. The presence of
either institutional Rule 3, the optimal foraging theory effort
switching rule (experiment #5), or the institutional rule for
limiting the harvesting of immature Pr (experiment #12) is
sufficient to prevent collapse of Pr. CDH refers to Callos de
Hacha, or pen shell, including either Atrina tuberculosa or Pr.
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Table 1. Collapse experiments, sorted by collapse threshold. The letter x indicates which stochastic variables and/or 
institutional rules are active in each experiment. Range represents the difference between the number of boats needed to 
trigger collapse in one stochastic run and the number of boats needed to trigger collapse in every stochastic run. 
 
















Range (%)  
14 x  x x 52 3 6% 
16 x x x x 52 4 8% 
15  x x x 51 3 6% 
13   x x 50 0 0% 
6 x  x  42 1 2% 
8 x x x  42 3 7% 
7  x x  41 1 2% 
5   x  40 0 0% 
10 x   x 27 2 7% 
12 x x  x 27 2 7% 
9    x 26 0 0% 
11  x  x 26 1 4% 
4 x x   24 2 8% 
1     23 0 0% 
2 x    23 1 4% 





Table 2. Recovery experiments, sorted by average recovery period. The letter x indicates which stochastic variables 


































16 x x x x 52 5.6 10.3 14.9 9.3 90% 
14 x  x x 52 6.3 10.4 15.5 9.2 88% 
13   x x 52 12.1 12.1 12.1 0.0 0% 
15  x x x 52 10.2 12.4 13.0 2.8 23% 
5   x  41 18.2 18.2 18.2 0.0 0% 
8 x x x  41 10.3 19.2 28.8 18.4 96% 
6 x  x  41 10.6 22.4 26.4 15.8 71% 
7  x x  41 14.4 22.6 29.9 15.5 69% 
10 x   x 27 20.4 37.3 53.1 32.7 88% 
9    x 27 44.6 44.6 44.6 0.0 0% 
11  x  x 27 24.6 48.4 53.5 28.9 60% 
12 x x  x 27 12.6 53.2 61.5 48.9 92% 
1     23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 x    23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3  x   23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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years). With only a rule to limit harvesting of immature Pr 
active, the system recovered in 20.3–61.5 years (average
recovery of 27.2–53.2 years). Five different experiment runs
are displayed in Figure 5B. 
Something very different happened in experiments #1–#4,
when neither institutional rule was in force. Without either
rule to lower the relative fishing pressure on Pr, the Pr 
population, as a result of its longer maturation times, was not
sufficiently resilient to recover from the near-collapsed state
it reached by year 30, and only the At population recovered.
However, because At was limited by its own carrying capacity,
lower than that of Pr, the total pen shell population never
climbed to the level it was at prior to the increase in fishing
pressure (Fig. 5B). Therefore, we recorded results of N/A for
recovery experiments #1–#4. Either institutional rule was
sufficient to keep Pr from collapsing (Fig. 5C). 
The stochastic variables did make a small difference in the
range of collapse thresholds (Table 3). Because higher collapse
thresholds had larger numerical ranges, the range was best
measured as a percentage of the average number of boats
needed to cause collapse. Again, there were four distinct
cohorts. By including stochastic fishing luck while keeping
average lifespan deterministic (experiments #3, #7, #11, #15),
results ranged 2–6%. When stochastic lifespans were included
for both species without any variation for fishing luck
(experiments #2, #6, #10, #14), results ranged 4–17%. When
both stochastic variables were included (experiments #4, #8,
#12, #16), results ranged 7–8%.  
The effect of stochasticity was best shown by the range of
recovery times for each of the recovery experiments, measured
as a percentage of the average recovery time (Table 4). The
results were clearly grouped by stochastic rules. Experiments
with both stochastic factors had recovery periods that ranged
90–96%; experiments with stochasticity only in lifetime had
recovery periods that varied by 7–88%; and experiments with
stochasticity only in fishing luck had recovery periods that
varied by 23–69%.
DISCUSSION
It is important to be specific about what exactly is being
examined (“resilience of what”) and against what specific
impacts that system’s resilience is measured (“resilience to
what”) (Scheffer et al. 2001). We expressly looked at the Seri
community’s social-ecological rules as factors that help
maintain or degrade resilience; thus, it is the resilience of the
Seri pen shell fishery to overfishing that is the subject of this
paper. By drawing a larger system boundary around the
system, we treated the fishing pressure as an endogenous
attribute of the system rather than an exogenous factor of the
sort more commonly studied in resilience research (Guttal and
Jayaprakash 2007). 
Our first hypothesis was that disaggregating the system into
two species and incorporating social-ecological rules the Seri
use to shift their harvest between the two species would better
capture the resilience of the actual system. Our results affirm
this hypothesis. By shifting fishing pressure from one species
to another, the Seri maintain the fishery longer with more
fishers and larger harvests. Compared to the scenarios wherein
fishing pressure was applied regardless of species, the
experiments where social-ecological rules limited harvesting
of immature Pr (Rule 4) were, on average, able to withstand
three more boats before collapsing, or 12% more than the 23–
24 boat baseline; experiments with fishing effort that varied
between the two species according to the foraging response
curve (Rule 3) were able to withstand an average of 17 extra
boats before collapse (75% increase); and experiments with
both rules were able to withstand 27–29 extra boats (~120%
increase). Furthermore, comparing all runs with social-
ecological rules to their counterparts, we found that adding
the rules decreased the number of years it takes the system to
recover from near-collapse, to as little as 5–13 years. 
The results also show the importance of different management
strategies for different species. In our model, Pr’s longer
maturation time and larger immature harvest made it more
susceptible than At to fishing pressure. In the absence of any
management strategy to correct for it, the population of Pr is
susceptible to an early collapse. However, by either limiting
their harvest of immature Pr directly (Rule 4) or shifting their
relative fishing effort (Rule 3), the Seri can give immature Pr 
a greater chance of growing to maturity. More importantly,
our results show that a carpet ban on immature harvesting, as
was modeled in our scenario test with Rule 4, is not needed to
prevent either species’ collapse, so long as the fishers pay
attention to the relative proportion of the two species, and
adjust accordingly. Indeed, paying attention to the relative
abundance of the two species is a much more effective strategy
than a targeted ban on immature harvests. More field studies
of Pr and At would be needed to verify that Pr is actually less
resilient than At in their natural habitat in the absence of Seri
rules. 
Our second hypothesis was that introducing environmental
variability would increase the range of possible outcomes but
might also reduce the resilience of the system, on average, by
making it more likely that a critical threshold would be crossed.
Our findings show that stochasticity does result in an increased
range of possible outcomes. The findings also show that
stochasticity can marginally increase the resilience of the
system. Contrary to our original hypothesis, the experiments
show that the stochasticity in the mature lifespan actually
increases the resilience of the system, as measured by the
amount of fishing pressure it can sustain, but only by one to
three additional boats before collapse (only 3–6%), as
compared to the deterministic case. However, the pattern is
consistent enough that it cannot be dismissed as noise. In the
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Table 3. Collapse experiments, sorted by the range of collapse thresholds in different runs (as percent of 
collapse threshold). The letter x indicates which stochastic variables and/or institutional rules are active in 
each experiment. Range represents the difference between the number of boats needed to trigger collapse in 








Rule 3: Seri 
optimal foraging 
theory rule 
Rule 4: Seri Pinna 
rugosa immature 
harvest rule 






4 x x   24 2 8% 
16 x x x x 52 4 8% 
12 x x  x 27 2 7% 
8 x x x  42 3 7% 
10 x   x 27 2 7% 
14 x  x x 52 3 6% 
15  x x x 51 3 6% 
2 x    23 1 4% 
3  x   23 1 4% 
11  x  x 26 1 4% 
7  x x  41 1 2% 
6 x  x  42 1 2% 
13   x x 50 0 0% 
5   x  40 0 0% 
9    x 26 0 0% 





Table 4. Recovery experiments, sorted by range between fastest and slowest recovery in different runs (as 
percent of recovery period). The letter x indicates which stochastic variables and/or institutional rules are 





































8 x x x  41 10.3 19.2 28.8 18.4 96% 
12 x x  x 27 12.6 53.2 61.5 48.9 92% 
16 x x x x 52 5.6 10.3 14.9 9.3 90% 
14 x  x x 52 6.3 10.4 15.5 9.2 88% 
10 x   x 27 20.4 37.3 53.1 32.7 88% 
6 x  x  41 10.6 22.4 26.4 15.8 71% 
7  x x  41 14.4 22.6 29.9 15.5 69% 
11  x  x 27 24.6 48.4 53.5 28.9 60% 
15  x x x 52 10.2 12.4 13.0 2.8 23% 
13   x x 52 12.1 12.1 12.1 0.0 0% 
5   x  41 18.2 18.2 18.2 0.0 0% 
9    x 27 44.6 44.6 44.6 0.0 0% 
1     23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 x    23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3  x   23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 x x   23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Ecology and Society 18(4): 50
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art50/
recovery experiments, the differences were more noticeable
but not consistent; while the presence of stochastic variables
did consistently produce faster recovery times in some runs,
it also produced much longer recovery times in other runs,
without any consistency in the effect on average recovery
time. 
The reason stochasticity increases the resilience of the
modeled system is due to the dual nature of the reinforcing
feedback loops for species recruitment. If the regrowth rate is
positive, then the reinforcing loop operates in a growth
trajectory and repopulates/sustains the species despite fishing
pressure. But if the regrowth rate is negative for a sustained
period of time, then the loop enters a collapse trajectory with
each year’s population being smaller than the last. In a
deterministic model, this can create a trap, whereby the
population is doomed to die out in the area being covered.
However, when mature lifespan is stochastic, there are quite
a few time periods where the regrowth rate is not only positive
but quite high, as opposed to the deterministic scenario where
the regrowth rate, depending on the harvest pressure, ends up
being negative or only slightly positive. This finding is
consistent with previous studies, which have drawn clear links
between natural variability in growth rates and resilience (Ives
1995, Holling and Meffe 1996). 
Our systematic analysis affirms that local communities can
effectively govern common-pool resources, so long as access
is controlled and rules are enforced (Cinti et al. 2010, Cinner
2011). The accord among the Seri social-ecological rules is
critical to maintaining a resilient system even in the presence
of environmental variability. These rules, rather than aiming
to eliminate the variability in the system for the sake of
maximizing harvest efficiency, actually protect the system
from outside interference and enforce adaptive harvesting that
respects the inherent variability in the system.  
Our model left out several key areas for future studies. We did
not attempt to directly incorporate how fluctuations in sale
price affect relative fishing effort. The price data cited in
Moreno et al. (2005) and that we collected for three time
periods—2000–2001, 2004–2006, and 2009–2012—show
that the price range is US$16–20 for A. tuberculosa and US$5–
6 for P. rugosa, which suggests that the price structure is
inelastic to supply and demand. The persistent price
differential between the two species does impact fishing
decisions, and this effect is incorporated into our model via
Rule 3, which shifts effort between the two species along an
OFT function. The Seri do choose either to allow outside
fishers into the channel or to expel them. However, we do not
model this fifth institutional rule in our model because it is
driven by many complex factors exogenous to our model, such
as the success of other Seri enterprises, financial transfers, and
the changing demand of outside fishers to enter the channel,
which is in turn driven by their local economies. In addition,
more extensive experiments with wider ranges of stochasticity
scenarios could also be conducted. The utility of a spatially
explicit model representation should also be explored.
CONCLUSION
No one element, but the particular combination of different
social-ecological rules and their interaction with the inherent
environmental variability of the system, enables the resilience
of the Seri artisanal fishery. This is in line with the view that
multi-pronged approaches rather than simplistic policy
prescriptions are needed in the management of complex
systems. Small-scale fisheries or artisanal fisheries are for the
most part multi-specific, but the management schemes are
often designed as if they were mono-specific. We show that
incorporating the variability in the system and the dynamics
of each species of concern into the modeling effort can lead
towards devising management and policy schemes that more
comprehensively take into account factors that ensure a more
sustainable future for these fisheries.
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Appendix 1:  
Parameter estimates used in the model, with brief explanations, estimates, and citations. 
Parameter Name Attribute of System Estimate Units Citation and/or 
Description 
Algae Percentage of seafloor 
covered by algae when 
algae are in season 
(during 1/3 of year). 
0.06 Dimensionless Torre-Cosio et al. 
2003; Basurto 2008 
cited in Bueno and 
Basurto 2009: 143 
Fecundity Rate This variable represents 
the number of individuals 
(baby mollusks) produced 
by a female mollusk over 
her lifetime. 




person per day 
Number of organisms 








Average number of Seri 
boats at start of model 
run, changed at year 5 for 
scenario testing. 
15 boats/year Basurto personal 






caught per boat 
per day 
Average number of 
organisms caught per 








Carrying Capacity for A. 
tuburculosa; is 1/3 of the 
24,500 carrying capacity 
for CDH from the Bueno 
and Basurto model. 
8,167 Thousand 
mollusks 




Carrying Capacity for A. 
tuburculosa; is 2/3 of the 
24,500 carrying capacity 
for CDH from the Bueno 
and Basurto model. 
16,333 Thousand 
mollusks 




Delay in fishers’ response 




year Interviews to key 
informants and 
Basurto personal 





eelgrass Percentage of seafloor 
covered by eelgrass when 
eelgrass is in season 
(during 2/3 of the year). 
0.22 Dimensionless  Torre-Cosio 2002; 
Basurto 2008 cited 
in Bueno and 
Basurto 2009 
Female percent Percent of population that 
is female. 




Mean FL Mean fishing luck; drives 
pink noise probability 
distribution function for 
fishing luck. 
1 Dimensionless Informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto in 2000, 
2001, and 2009 
Standard 
Deviation FL 
Standard Deviation for 
fishing luck; drives pink 
noise probability 
distribution function for 
fishing luck. 
0.5 Dimensionless Informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto in 2000, 
2001, and 2009 
Correlation Time 
FL 
Correlation time of pink 
noise probability 







Percentage of CDH 
population composed of 
Pr. 
2/3 Dimensionless Informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto since 1998 
Initial immature 
At population 
Initial immature At 
population (initial ratio of 





with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto since 1998 
Initial immature 
Pr population 





with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto since 1998 
Initial mature At 
population 





with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto since 1998 
Initial mature Pr 
population 





with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto since 1998 
Initial At 
harvested 
Starting point for the 
tonnage harvest of At; 
needed for delay to 
function. 




Starting point for the 
tonnage harvest of Pr; 
needed for delay to 
function. 
14 Tons/year  
Mean At Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature At lifetime; when 
model in deterministic 
mode this becomes the 
adult lifespan. 
9 Year  Discussed in text. 
See Mean Pr 
Standard 
Deviation At 
Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature At lifetime. 
2 Year  
Correlation Time 
At 
Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature At lifetime. 
1 Year   
Mean Pr Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature Pr lifetime; when 
model in deterministic 
mode this becomes the 
adult lifespan. 
12 year Vicente et al. 1980; 
Siletic and Peharda 
2003; Cudney-
Bueno and 2008; 
discussed in text 
Standard 
Deviation Pr 
Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature Pr lifetime. 
3 Year   
Correlation Time 
Pr 
Drives pink noise 
distribution function for 
mature Pr lifetime. 
1 Year   
Number of 
immature At per 
kg 
Used to convert immature 
At harvest numbers, 
measured in thousand 





Basurto 2006; 193, 
informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto, and catch 
counts conducted 
by Basurto in 2009 
Number of 
immature Pr per 
kg 
Used to convert immature 
Pr harvest numbers, 
measured in thousand 





Basurto 2006; 193, 
informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto, and catch 
counts conducted 
by Basurto in 2009 
 4 
Number of 
mature At per kg 
Used to convert mature 
At harvest numbers, 
measured in thousand 





Basurto 2006; 193, 
informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto, and catch 
counts conducted 
by Basurto in 2009 
Number of 
mature Pr per kg 
Used to convert mature 
Pr harvest numbers, 
measured in thousand 





Basurto 2006; 193, 
informal interviews 
with expert fisher 
key informants by 
Basurto, and catch 
counts conducted 
by Basurto in 2009 
Number of 
people/boat 
Crew of one boat, usually 
contains only one diver 
plus three other 
crewmembers. 
4 people/boat Bueno & Basurto 
2009 
Rule 1 days 
fished 
Percentage of year fished. 0.5 Year Bueno & Basurto 
2009 
Rule 4 At 
immature harvest 
Lack of any enforced 
limitation on the 




Bueno & Basurto 
2009 
Rule 4 Pr 
immature harvest 
No allowed take of 
immature Pr when active. 





Catch counts and 
underwater 
harvesting 
observations in the 
field by Basurto in 
two multi-year time 
periods: 1998-2001 
and 2009-2012. 
OFT function in 
terms of Pr 
Type III functional 
response curve for 
distributing fishing effort 
for Pr and At based on 
perceived proportion of 
Pr in the underwater 
CDH. Effort for At is 1 



















Holt equation function of 
the survival rate of newly 
born CDH based on the 











Dimensionless Bueno and Basurto 
2009, modified 
time to mature At length of time for At to 
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Appendix 2: Model equations 
 
The model was built using the Vensim software, produced by Ventana Systems, Inc. 
(www.vensim.com). Vensim PLE is freely available, and is required to read, modify, and run the 
model. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Immature PR Population= INTEG ( 
 births PR-maturation rate PR-immature PR harvested,initial CDH population*Initial 
Proportion PR*immature ratio) 
thousand molluscs 
 
Mature PR Population= INTEG ( 
 maturation rate PR-natural deaths PR-mature PR harvested,initial CDH population*Initial 
Proportion PR*(1-immature ratio)) 
thousand molluscs 
 
Mature AT Population= INTEG ( 
 maturation rate AT-natural deaths AT-mature AT harvested,initial CDH population*(1-
Initial Proportion PR)*(1-immature ratio)) 
thousand molluscs 
 
Immature AT Population= INTEG ( 
 births AT-maturation rate AT-immature AT harvested,initial CDH population*(1-Initial 
Proportion PR)*immature ratio) 
thousand molluscs 
 
immature ratio = 0.1 
Dmnl 
 
stable CDH population with 15 boats=initial CDH population 
thousand molluscs 
  
population effect AT=surviving rate function (Total CDH AT/carrying capacity AT) 
Dmnl 
 
population effect PR=surviving rate function (Total CDH PR/carrying capacity PR) 
Dmnl 
 
Seri average boats=initial boats*(1-outsider boat percentage)+PULSE( 5 , 100 )*(more boats*(1-
outsider boat percentage)) 
boat/Year 
Average number of boats at start of model run; pulse at year 5 with more Seri boats for scenario 
testing 
 
outsider average boats=initial boats*outsider boat percentage+PULSE( 5 , 100 )*(more 
boats*outsider boat percentage) 
boat/Year 
Number of outsider boats in fishery, with pulse at 25 years of more outsider boats 
 





"Stochastic Adult Lifetime?"=0 
Dmnl 
 
mature lifespan distribution AT=IF THEN ELSE( "Stochastic Adult Lifetime?"=1, Pink Noise AT, 9) 
years 
 
more boats=final boats-initial boats 
boats/Year [0,50,1] 
 
"Rule 4 On?"=0 
Dmnl 
 
rule 4 PR immature harvest=IF THEN ELSE( "Rule 4 On?"=1, 0, 1) 
Dmnl 
0 to turn rule on at 100%, 1 to turn rule off 
 
fishing luck distribution=IF THEN ELSE("Stochastic Fishing Luck?"=1, Pink Noise FL, 1) 
Dmnl 
 
mature lifespan distribution PR=IF THEN ELSE( "Stochastic Adult Lifetime?"=1,Pink Noise PR,12) 
years 
 
"Stochastic Fishing Luck?"=0 
Dmnl 
 
"Rule 3 On?"=0 
Dmnl 
 
boats to collapse=IF THEN ELSE((Total CDH Population/carrying capacity CDH)<0.1, (Seri average 
boats+outsider average boats), 0) 
boat/Year 
 
recovery=IF THEN ELSE( Total CDH Population>stable CDH population with 15 boats,1, 0 ) 
Dmnl 
 
fecundity rate AT=fecundity rate PR 
Dmnl 
 
Change in Pink Noise Fec=(White Noise Fec-Pink Noise Fec)/Correlation Time Fec 
Dmnl 
 
Standard Deviation Fec=5 
Year 
 
White Noise Fec=20*(White Noise AT/9) 
Year 
 
births AT=Mature AT Population*female percent*(fecundity rate AT/mature lifespan distribution 
AT)*population effect AT 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
Correlation Time Fec=1 
Year 
 
Pink Noise Fec= INTEG (Change in Pink Noise Fec,Mean Fec) 
Year 
 






White Noise PR=12*(White Noise AT/9) 
Year 
 
White Noise FL=Mean FL+ 
 (((Standard Deviation FL^2)* 
 ((2-(TIME STEP/Correlation Time FL)) / (TIME STEP/Correlation Time FL)))^0.5)* 
 RANDOM NORMAL(-Mean FL,Mean FL,0, 1, NOISE SEED ) 
Dmnl 
 
Change in Pink Noise FL=(White Noise FL-Pink Noise FL)/Correlation Time FL 
Dmnl/Year 
 






Pink Noise FL= INTEG (Change in Pink Noise FL,Mean FL) 
Dmnl 
 
Correlation Time FL=0.25 
Year 
 
Change in Pink Noise AT=(White Noise AT-Pink Noise AT)/Correlation Time AT 
Dmnl 
 






Pink Noise AT= INTEG (Change in Pink Noise AT,Mean AT) 
Year 
 
Pink Noise PR= INTEG (Change in Pink Noise PR,Mean PR) 
Year 
 
White Noise AT=Mean AT+ 
 (((Standard Deviation AT^2)* 
 ((2-(TIME STEP/Correlation Time AT)) / (TIME STEP/Correlation Time AT)))^0.5)* 
 RANDOM NORMAL(-Mean AT,Mean AT+40,0, 1, NOISE SEED ) 
Year 
 
natural deaths PR=Mature PR Population / mature lifespan distribution PR 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
Correlation Time AT=1 
Year 
 
Correlation Time PR=1 
Year 
 
regrowth and density=regrowth rate CDH/"Total CDH Population/Carrying Capacity" 
Dmnl 
 
Standard Deviation PR=3 
Year 
 














to market=total CDH harvested in tons per year 
tons/Year 
 
Seri Harvet Rate=Seri harvest rate of AT+Seri harvest rate of PR 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
total CDH harvested in tons per year= INTEG (annual total CDH harvested in tons-to market, 66) 
tons/Year 
 
Seri harvest rate of PR=Seri harvest capacity*rule 3 proportion of fishing effort for PR 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
Seri harvest rate of AT=Seri harvest capacity*rule 3 proportion of fishing effort for AT 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
immature PR harvested=((outsider harvest rate of PR+Seri harvest rate of PR)*fishing luck 




regrowth rate AT=births AT - natural deaths AT - mature AT harvested 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
regrowth rate PR=births PR-natural deaths PR-mature PR harvested 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 regrowth rate CDH=(births PR+births AT)-(natural deaths PR+natural deaths AT)-(mature AT 
harvested+mature PR harvested) 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
births PR=Mature PR Population*female percent*(fecundity rate PR/mature lifespan distribution 
PR)*population effect PR 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
mature AT density=Mature AT Population/carrying capacity CDH 
Dmnl 
 
mature PR density=Mature PR Population/carrying capacity CDH 
Dmnl 
 






total immature CDH=Immature AT Population+Immature PR Population 
thousand molluscs 
 
Total CDH AT=Immature AT Population+Mature AT Population 
thousand molluscs 
 
maturation rate AT=Immature AT Population/time to mature AT 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 






immature PR density=Immature PR Population/carrying capacity CDH 
Dmnl 
 
time to mature AT=1 
Year 
 
mature PR harvested=(outsider harvest rate of PR+Seri harvest rate of PR)*fishing luck 
distribution*mature PR density*(1-rule 2 Percentage of Seagrass Coverage) 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
immature AT harvested=((outsider harvest rate of AT+Seri harvest rate of AT)*immature AT 




mature AT harvested=(outsider harvest rate of AT+Seri harvest rate of AT)*fishing luck 






outsider fishing effort=Seri fishing effort 
Year 
 
initial AT harvested=23 
tons/Year 
 
tons PR harvested per year=DELAY1I( ((immature PR harvested/number of immature PR per 
kg)+(mature PR harvested/number of mature PR per kg)), default delay, initial PR harvested) 
tons/Year 
 
tons AT harvested per year=DELAY1I( ((immature AT harvested/number of immature AT per 
kg)+(mature AT harvested/number of mature AT per kg)), default delay, initial AT harvested) 
tons/Year 
 
initial PR harvested=14 
tons/Year 
 
Outsider harvest capacity=(outsider fishing effort*days per year*number of organisms caught per 
boat per day*outsider average boats) 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
outsider harvest rate of AT=Outsider harvest capacity 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
outsider harvest rate of PR=Outsider harvest capacity 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
thousand PR harvested per year=mature PR harvested + immature PR harvested 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
thousand AT harvested per year=immature AT harvested + mature AT harvested 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
perceived relative abundance PR=SMOOTH(relative abundance PR,default delay) 
Dmnl 
 default delay=1/12 
Year 
 
proportion immature in current AT harvest=IF THEN ELSE(thousand AT harvested per 
year>0,immature AT harvested/thousand AT harvested per year,0) 
Dmnl 
 
proportion immature in current PR harvest=IF THEN ELSE(thousand PR harvested per 
year>0,immature PR harvested/thousand PR harvested per year,0) 
Dmnl 
 
initial CDH population=23683 
thousand molluscs 
 
time to mature PR=2 
Year 
 
maturation rate PR=Immature PR Population/time to mature PR 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
rule 1 days fished=1*Seri fishing effort 
years 
 
total mature CDH=Mature AT Population+Mature PR Population 
thousand molluscs 
 
annual total CDH harvested in tons=tons AT harvested per year+tons PR harvested per year 
tons/Year 
 
proportion AT of harvest=IF THEN ELSE(annual total CDH harvested in tons>0, tons AT harvested 
per year/annual total CDH harvested in tons, 0) 
Dmnl 
 
proportion of PR of harvest=IF THEN ELSE(annual total CDH harvested in tons>0, tons PR 
harvested per year/annual total CDH harvested in tons, 0) 
Dmnl 
 
natural deaths AT=Mature AT Population / mature lifespan distribution AT 
thousand molluscs/Year 
 
Seri harvest capacity=(rule 1 days fished*days per year*number of organisms caught per boat per 
day*Seri average boats) 
thousand molluscs/Year 
Maximum annual harvest for all Seri boats in the fishery. 
 
actual proportion PR in current harvest=IF THEN ELSE((thousand AT harvested per year+thousand 
PR harvested per year)>0, thousand PR harvested per year/(thousand PR harvested per 
year+thousand AT harvested per year), 0) 
Dmnl 
 
relative abundance AT=1-relative abundance PR 
Dmnl 
 
Total CDH Population=Total CDH AT + Total CDH PR 
thousand molluscs 
 
Total CDH PR=Immature PR Population+Mature PR Population 
thousand molluscs 
 
days per year=365 
days/Year 
 
relative abundance PR=Total CDH PR/Total CDH Population 
Dmnl 
 
"Total CDH Population/Carrying Capacity"=Total CDH Population/carrying capacity CDH 
Dmnl 
 
Initial Proportion PR=2/3 
Dmnl 
Anecdotal evidence from Basurto (unpublished) suggests a PR:AT ratio of 2:1. 
 
number of mature PR per kg=20 
thousand molluscs/tons 
 
number of immature PR per kg=RANDOM NORMAL (1,2,1.75,0.2,0)*number of mature PR per kg 
thousand molluscs/tons 
 






algae=0.06+0.06*PULSE( 10, duration ) *-decrease in seagrass 
Dmnl 
Percentage of seafloor covered by algae when algae is in season. 
 






number of organisms caught per boat per day=2.16 
thousand molluscs/boat/day 
 
"number of people/boat"=4 
person/boat 
Crew of one boat. Default in Seri community is 4; one diver plus three other crew members. 
 
"Average organism per person/day"=0.54 
thousand molluscs/person/day 
 
number of mature AT per kg=30 
thousand molluscs/tons 
 
number of immature AT per kg=RANDOM NORMAL (0,2,1.75,0.2,0)*30 
thousand molluscs/tons 
 
rule 4 AT immature harvest=1 
Dmnl 
0 to turn rule on, 1 to turn rule off. There is no rule preventing the catch of immatures, but for the 
most part, divers catch very little numbers of immatures because they cannot see them! With no 
feedbacks or forcing rules, the percentage of immatures caught is equal to their percentage in the 
overal population, which varies between 20% and 30%. This seems about right; 30% is an upper 
bound. 
 
Seri fishing effort=0.5 
Year 
 
eelgrass=0.22+0.22*PULSE( 10, duration )*-decrease in seagrass 
Dmnl 
percentage of seafloor covered by eelgrass when eelgrass is in season. Commercial Seri fishers do 
not fish in the eelgrass. 
 
rule 2 Percentage of Seagrass Coverage=PULSE TRAIN(0, 0.67, 1 , 1000 )*eelgrass+PULSE 
TRAIN(0.67 , 0.33 , 1 ,1000 )*algae 
Dmnl 
Field research by Torre-Cosio (2002) and Basurto (2008) reported that, during roughly 8 months of 
the year, the eelgrass Zostera marina covers 22% of the Infiernillo Channel's sea bottom, and in the 





carrying capacity CDH=24500 
thousand molluscs 
 
carrying capacity AT= carrying capacity CDH*(1-Initial proportion PR) 
thousand molluscs 
 
carrying capacity PR= carrying capacity CDH*Initial proportion PR 
thousand molluscs 
 
FINAL TIME  = 100 
Year 
 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
Year 
 
TIME STEP = 0.02 
Year 
Appendix 3. Model
Please click here to download file ‘appendix3.mdl’.
